Zions First National Bank and 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Zions First National Bank and 4447 Associates v.
First Security Financial : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey M. Jones; J. Mark Gibb; Durham, Evans, Jones & Pinegar; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Scott H. Clark; James S. Jardine; Brent D. Wride; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Zions First National Bank v. First Security Financial, No. 970644 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1191




K F U 
50 
DOCKET NO. VOMtm 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a 
national banking association, 
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
general partnership, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No. 970644-CA 
Priority No. 15 
Brief of Appellant 
Appeal from Judgment Entered by 
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
J. Mark Gibb 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
Suite 850, Key Bank Tower 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
Scott H. Clark 
James S. Jardine 
Brent D. Wride 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUN - 8 1998 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a 
national banking association, 
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
general partnership, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No- 970644-CA 
Priority No. 15 
Brief of Appellant 
Appeal from Judgment Entered by 
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
J. Mark Gibb 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
Suite 850, Key Bank Tower 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Scott H. Clark 
James S. Jardine 
Brent D. Wride 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellee Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 3 
Statement of Facts 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED ON REMAND BY HOLDING THAT 
SECTION 70A-9-318(3) DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE . 8 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FIRST 
SECURITY AND CAPITOL WERE NOT ENTITLED TO MODIFY 
THEIR CONTRACT PURSUANT TO SECTION 70A-3-318(2) 
NOTWITHSTANDING NOTICE OF THE ASSIGNMENT 16 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO 4447 ASSOCIATES 19 
CONCLUSION 20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 21 
ADDENDUM 
A. Order Concerning Defendant's Defenses to Judgment 
B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Concerning 
Defendant's Defenses to Judgment 
C. Asset Purchase Agreement 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
America First Credit Union v. First Sec. Bank, 930 
P.2d 1198 (Utah 1997) 1, 6, 11, 12 
America First Credit Union v. First Security Bank., 
910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995) 5 
Bank One. Texas v. Communication Specialirts, 813 
S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) 17 
Corbett v. Corbett. 569 P.2d 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) . . . 14 
Cumming v. Johnsonf 616 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1979) 14 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) . . . . 19 
First Fidelity Bank v. Matthews. 692 P.2d 1255 
(Mont. 1984) 14 
First Finance Co. v. Akathiotis. 249 N.E.2d 663 (111. 
Ct. App. 1969) 14 
Frankford Trust Co. v. Stainless Steel Servs., Inc., 
475 A. 2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) 13 
Kennecott Copper Co. v. Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 
1156 (Utah 1990) 1 
Martin v. John Clay & Co.. 167 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1943) 16 
Petty y. Clark, 192 P.2d 589 (Utah 1948) 15 
Time Finance Corp. v. Johnson Trucking Co., 458 P.2d 
873 (Utah 1969) 9, 10 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. S 70A-9-318f3) 9, 12, 15, 16 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) . . . l, 2, 7 
U.C.C. § 9-318 18 
iii 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
ISSUES 
There are three issues before the Court: 
I. Did the district court err in holding that Utah Code 
Annotated Section 70A-9-318(3), as interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in America First Credit Union v. First Sec. Bank, 
930 P.2d 1198 (Utah 1997), does not apply to this case?1 Because 
this is a legal issue, the standard of review is de novo, and 
this Court reviews the decision of the district court for 
correctness. Kennecott Copper Co. v. Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 
1156 (Utah 1990). 
II. Did the district court err in holding that Utah Code 
Annotated Section 70A-9-318(2) does not entitle First Security to 
judgment in its favor.2 This is a legal issue, and the standard 
of review is de novo. Id. 
III. Did the district court err in awarding attorney's fees 
to 4447 Associates when the dispute between the parties did not 
"arise under" the original contract but centered around whether 
xThis issue was raised in First Security's Motion for Entry 
of Judgment in Favor of First Security, R. 2245-62. 
2This issue was raised in First Security's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 1871-
78. 
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First Security had received notice of an assignment of the 
contract?3 The standard of review is de novo. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
This case is governed by Utah Code Annotated Section 7 0A-9-
318 (1990), which provides: 
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable 
agreement not to assert defenses or claims arising out of a 
sale as provided in Section 70A-9-206 the rights of an 
assignee are subject to: 
(a) all the terms of the contract between the 
account debtor and assignor and any defense or claim 
arising therefrom; and 
(b) any other defense or claim of the 
account debtor against the assignor which accrues 
before the account debtor receives notification of 
the assignment. 
(2) So far as the right to payment or a part thereof 
under an assigned contract has not been fully earned by 
performance, and notwithstanding notification of the 
assignment, any modification of or substitution for the 
contract made in good faith and in accordance with 
reasonable commercial standards is effective against an 
assignee unless the account debtor has otherwise agreed but 
the assignee acguires corresponding rights under the 
modified or substituted contract. The assignment may 
provide that such modification or substitution is a breach 
by the assignor. 
(3) The account debtor is authorized to pay the 
assignor until the account debtor receives notification that 
the amount due or to become due has been assigned and that 
payment is to be made to the assignee. A notification which 
does not reasonably identify the rights assigned is 
ineffective. If requested by the account debtor, the 
assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable proof that the 
assignment has been made and unless he does so the account 
debtor may pay the assignor. 
3This issue was originally raised in First Security's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 1883-85. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings. 
This appeal involves a dispute between 4447 Associates and 
First Security Financial ("First Security") over whether First 
Security received proper notice that its debt to its original 
creditor had been assigned and that First Security should make 
payments to the assignee. 
After trial, the district court held that the required 
notice had not been given and that First Security was therefore 
free to satisfy its debt through an agreement with th£ original 
creditor. R. 781. The district court entered judgment in favor 
of First Security, R. 783-84, and 4447 Associates appealed, R. 
789-90. This Court reversed and held that notice of the 
assignment had been given. 889 P.2d 467. The case was then 
remanded to the district court. Id. Before the district court 
entered judgment in the case, the Utah Supreme Court issued its 
decision in America First. First Security then moved for 
judgment in its favor based upon the America First decision. R. 
2245-46. First Security also argued on remand that it was 
allowed to modify the contract with Capitol pursuant to section 
318(2). R. 1871-78. The district court denied First Security's 
motion, R. 2351-56, and entered judgment in favor of 4447 
Associates, R. 2357-59. First Security then filed a timely 
notice of appeal. R. 2369-70. 
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Statement of Facts, 
1. In 1982 First Security and Capitol Thrift & Loan Company 
("Capitol") entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement whereby 
First Security acquired certain assets from Capitol &nd became 
obligated to make certain payments to Capitol. R. 776. 
2. Disputes subsequently arose between First Security and 
Capitol. On July 10, 1985, the parties entered into a Settlement 
Agreement whereby Capitol settled its disputes with First 
Security and cancelled First Security's debt to Capitol under the 
Asset Purchase Agreement. R. 780. 
3. Prior to settling with First Security, Capitol had 
assigned to Zions First National Bank ("Zions") its interest in 
the Asset Purchase Agreement as collateral for a loan that 
Capitol obtained from Zions. R. 777. 
4. Zions, as assignee, filed suit against First Security to 
collect the debt that had been cancelled by Capitol. R. 2-39. 
5. In June 1990, after filing suit, Zions assigned its 
interest in the Asset Purchase Agreement to the appellee, 4447 
Associates. R. 780. 
6. At trial before the Third District Court, the court held 
that 4447 Associates "failed to prove that First Security 
received sufficient notice of the assignment, as required by 
law," to preclude First Security from satisfying its debt with 
the original creditor, Capitol. R. 709. 
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7. 4447 Associates then filed an appeal, which was heard by 
this Court. 889 P.2d 467. The issue on that appeal was whether 
the district court had correctly determined that First Security 
did not receive adequate notice of the assignment frton Capitol to 
Zions. Id, at 470. First Security argued that under section 
70A-9-318(3), First Security had to receive notice of two things: 
(a) notice of the fact of the assignment, and (b) notice that 
First Security should make payments to Zions rather than Capitol. 
Id. at 472 n.8. 
8. The court of appeals determined that First Security had 
received notice of the assignment through a footnote in a 
financial statement received by First Security. Id. at 474. The 
court of appeals also held that while First Security "clearly11 
had not received the dual notice required by section 318(3), id. 
at 470 n.5, as a legal matter, section 318(3) did not apply to 
its analysis. Id. at 472 n.8. The court of appeals reversed and 
remanded this case to the district court. 
9. First Security then filed a petition for certiorari with 
the Utah Supreme Court seeking review of the decision of the 
court of appeals. The petition was denied without comment by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 899 P.2d 1231. 
10. However, the supreme court granted a petition for 
certiorari in the similar case of America First Credit Union v. 
First Security Bank. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). First Security's 
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petition in America First specifically referred to this case and 
urged the supreme court to resolve the issue in both cases 
concerning the proper application of the dual notice requirement 
in section 70A-9-318(3). R. 2008. 
11. While this case was on remand to the district court, 
and before judgment was entered, the Utah Supreme Court issued 
its decision in the America First case. 930 P.2d 1198 (Utah 
1997). Based upon that decision, First Security moved for 
judgment in its favor. R. 2245-46. First Security argued that 
the district court was obligated to follow the law as announced 
by the supreme court in America First, which implicitly overruled 
portions of the decision of the court of appeals in this case. 
R. 2252-55. 
12. The district court disagreed with 4447 Associates' 
argument that res judicata and law of the case prevented the 
district court from considerirg the America First decision. The 
court held: "The Court has the authority to consider and apply 
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in America First Credit Union 
v. First Security Bank of Utah." R. 2355. However, the district 
court ruled against First Security on the merits and entered 
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judgment in favor of 4447 Associates.4 The court also awarded 
attorney's fees to 4447 Associates. R. 2357-58. 
13. First Security then filed a timely notice of appeal 
from the judgment entered in favor of 4447 Associated. R. 2369-
70. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. On remand the district court was required to apply the 
law as announced by the highest appellate court in the state. In 
America First, the Utah Supreme Court held that, even in cases 
where an account debt is fully satisfied, section 70A-9-318(3) 
requires notice not only that the account has been assigned but 
also that the debtor should make payments to the assignee. 
Because there is no dispute that the dual notice requirement of 
section 70A-9-318 was not satisfied in this case, the district 
court erred by not entering judgment in favor of First Security. 
II. Section 318(2) provides that parties may modify 
executory contracts even when notice of an assignment has been 
provided. There is no dispute that the contract in this case was 
executory because a number of quarterly interest payments 
remained due. The district court therefore erred in holding that 
First Security was not entitled to judgment in its favor. 
4The district court held: "Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-
9-318(3) does not apply to this action pursuant to the decision 
of the Utah Court of Appeals." R. 2354. The district court did 
not state whether it believed that America First overruled the 
decision of the court of appeals. R. 2 3 58. 
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III. In addition, the district court erred in awarding 
attorney's fees to 4447 Associates. The Asset Purchase Agreement 
between First Security and Capitol allows attorney's fees only 
for disputes "arising under" the Asset Purchase Agreement. The 
dispute between First Security and 4447 Associates did not 
involve any provision of the Asset Purchase Agreement or arise 
under it in any way. Rather, the dispute turned solely on 
whether First Security had received notice of an assignment of 
the Asset Purchase Agreement. This dispute is extraneous to the 
Asset Purchase Agreement and not contemplated by it. Therefore 
the district court erred in awarding attorney's fees to 4447 
Associates. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED ON REMAND BY HOLDING THAT SECTION 
70A-9-318(3) DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE. 
As an account debtor whose account obligation was assigned 
to a third party, First Security's rights and duties are governed 
by section 70A-9-318(3) of the Utah Code. That section provides: 
(3) The account debtor is authorized to pay the 
assignor until the account debtor receives notification that 
the amount due or to become due has been assigned and that 
payment is to be made to the assignee. A notification which 
does not reasonably identify the rights assigned is 
ineffective. If requested by the account debtor, the 
assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable proof that the 
assignment has been made and unless he does so the account 
debtor may pay the assignor. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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When this case was before this Court on the first appeal, 
this Court ruled that, as a matter of law, section 318(3) did not 
apply to its analysis, stating: 
The two-pronged notice requirement mandated by Utah Code 
Ann. § 7GA-9-318(3) (1990) is not applicable to our 
analvsis. Section 9-318(3) sets forth the notice 
requirements for an assignee to receive payments directly 
from the account debtor. In the instant case, the question 
of whether Zions was entitled to receive payments from First 
Security as they became due does not merit consideration. 
889 P.2d at 472 n.8 (emphasis added). This Court apparently 
believed that the dual notice requirement of section 318(3) 
applies only to "payments as they become due" and not a payment 
in full like the settlement in this case. Id. However, as shown 
below, the Utah Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion in 
America First. 
As noted by the supreme court, section 70A-9-318(3) clearly 
requires notice not only of the fact of the assignment but also 
that the account debtor must pay the assignee. The burden is on 
the assignee to provide clear and adequate notice. This 
requirement is supported by the same policy considerations set 
forth in the supreme court's earlier decision in Time Finance 
Corp. v. Johnson Trucking Co., 458 P.2d 873 (Utah 1969): 
"The fact, however, of such substitution of a new creditor 
must, in order to make the debtor liable to the assignee, be 
brought home to the debtor with much exactness and certainty 
before he has paid the debt. The rule of notice to him is 
much more stringent than that which may defeat the title of 
a purchaser of a chose in action or of real estate. The 
latter is free to purchase or refuse to purchase as he 
chooses, and therefore it is his duty, before acting to 
9 
trace out any reasonable doubt and to inform himself of the 
true facts as soon as anything arises to put him on inquiry. 
But the debtor is not so situated. He must pay to his 
original creditor when the debt is due unless he can 
establish affirmatively that someone else has a better 
right. The notice to him therefore must be of so exact and 
specific a character as to convince him that he' is no longer 
liable to such original creditor." 
Id. at 876-77. 
Section 318(3) protects consumers and other account debtors 
by allowing them to deal directly with their creditors in 
resolving disputes, notwithstanding the common practice of 
assigning accounts to remote lenders as collateral for accounts 
and inventory financing. A typical example of such a case is as 
follows: 
John Smith purchased a car from Uptown Used Cars and 
arranged for financing at the dealership. At the time of 
the purchase, John received written notice that Uptown Used 
Cars assigns its accounts to Friendly Finance. The notice 
did not indicate that John should make payments to Friendly 
Finance. 
A few months later, John decided to sell his car to his 
neighbor and called Uptown Used Cars for the payoff amount. 
Uptown Used Cars provided this information, and John sent a 
check to Uptown for the entire amount. 
Thereafter, Uptown Used Cars went out of business 
without paying Friendly Finance. Friendly Finance then sued 
John for the full payoff amount, arguing that John knew that 
the account had been assigned and was therefore prohibited 
from paying the account in full to Uptown Used Cars. 
Friendly Finance acknowledged that John was authorized to 
make his regular monthly payments to Uptown Used Cars as 
they became due, but it asserted that the notice of 
assignment prohibited John from paying the account in full 
to Uptown Used Cars without the permission of Friendly 
Finance. 
Under the prior ruling of this Court, John would have no 
protection under section 318(3) because he did not make "payments 
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as they became due" to Uptown Used Cars but instead resolved the 
debt in its entirety despite knowledge of the assignment. 
However, the supreme court correctly recognized in America First 
that the protections of section 318(3) are not so narrow and that 
the words "as they become due" should not be inserted into 
section 318 (3). 
In America First, America First Credit Union ("America 
First") made three loans to a food service company called 
Renaissance, 930 P.2d at 1200, As security for these loans, 
Renaissance assigned to America First a savings certificate it 
had with First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. ("First Security"). 
Id. First Security was given notice of the assignment and acted 
on this assignment by placing a "flag" or "block" on the account 
in its computer system. Id. -
When its savings certificate expired, Renaissance 
represented to First Security that the assignment to America 
First had been released. Id. First Security then paid 
Renaissance the entire amount of the certificate. Id. America 
First later sued First Security for payment of the certificate. 
Id. The trial court held that First Security had recognized both 
that there had been an assignment and n/that payment should be 
made to America First'" and had flagged its computer system 
accordingly. Id. at 1201. Therefore, the district court entered 
judgment in favor of America First. Id. First Security 
11 
appealed. Id. The court of appeals concluded that "First 
Security had not shown the factual findings of the trial court to 
be clearly erroneous." Id. The supreme court then granted 
certiorari. Id. 
In its decision, the supreme court emphasized certain 
portions of section 318(3) as follows: 
The account debtor is authorized to pay the assignor until 
the account debtor receives notification that the amount due 
or to become due has been assigned and that payment is to be 
made to the assignee. 
Id. (emphasis added by supreme court). The court then stated: 
This statute imposes a two-pronged notice requirement. 
First, notice of the assignment must be given. Second, the 
notice must state that payments are to be made to the 
assignee. 
Id. While the credit union in America First argued—similar to 
the reasoning in this Court's prior opinion—that the second 
prong of section 318(3) "is tailored to 'indirect collection' 
situations and therefore does not apply," the supreme court 
rejected this interpretation and applied both prongs of section 
318(3) even though there had been a full payment.5 Id. In doing 
so, it made clear that section 318(3) is not limited to cases 
5Under the facts of America First, the supreme court 
ultimately found that "First Security received notice of the 
assignment and that payment was to be made to [America First1 as 
required by Utah Code Ann. S 70A-9-318(3)." Id. at 1201-1202 
(emphasis added). Thus, the supreme court found that the second 
prong of section 318(3) was satisfied. 
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involving the assignment of payments "as they become due," as 
held by this Court in its prior opinion. 
The decision of the supreme court in America First is in 
accordance with the decisions of other jurisdictions'" that have 
decided v/hether section 318(3) applies only to "payments as they 
become due" or also to cases where debts are paid in full or 
extinguished. In Frankford Trust Co. v. Stainless Steel Servs.. 
Inc., the defendant, Stainless Steel Services, entered into a 
lease agreement for certain equipment, 475 A.2d 14 7, 149 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1984). Disputes arose between the defendant and the 
original lessor. The parties agreed to abrogate the lease, and 
the original lessor released Stainless from its duties 
thereunder. However, the lease had already been assigned to 
Frankford Trust Co. The court was therefore faced with the very 
question that exists in this case: May a party settle an 
obligation with its original creditor if it has not received the 
dual notice required by section 318(3)? In ruling on this 
question the court held: 
Among the defenses to the entry of judgment asserted by 
Stainless is the argument that the original parties had 
agreed to abrogate the lease agreement and to release 
Stainless from its duties thereunder. Such discharge of 
contractual obligation if agreed to by both Stainless and 
Commercial before notice of assignment, would establish a 
binding and meritorious defense against Frankford's claim as 
assignee. Under the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code 
and as a settled principle of contract law an "assignor 
[Commercial! retains his power to discharge or modify the 
duty of the obligor [Stainless] . . . [until] the obligor 
receives notification that the right has been assigned and 
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that performance is to be rendered to the assignee 
[Frankford]." 
Id. at 150 (brackets and ellipses in original; emphasis added). 
Likewise, the court held in First Fidelity Bank v. Matthews 
that the original parties to an agreement were entitled to 
"terminate11 the agreement where the dual notice required by 
section 318(3) had not been provided. 692 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Mont. 
1984). In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that 
participation in a settlement "constituted 'payment'" for 
purposes of section 318. Cumming v. Johnson, 616 F.2d 1069, 1073 
(9th Cir. 1979). The Court of Appeals of Arizona reached the 
same conclusion: "Where one purports to pay an obligation prior 
to the time he is obligated to pay it, and the obligee receives 
his tender for the purpose of extinguishing all or part of debt, 
then there is ,payment.,n Corbett v. Corbett, 569 P.2d 292, 294 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). See also First Finance Co. v. Akathiotis, 
249 N.E.2d 663, 665 (111. Ct. App. 1969) ("Defendant paid the 
full contract price to his seller as he was authorized to do 
under section 9-318 of the Code, absent notice by the assignee of 
the assignment and demand that payments be made to the 
assignee"). 
The cases cited above support the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in America First and demonstrate that First 
Security was entitled to settle its obligation with its original 
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creditor, Capitol, until it received notice that it was to pay 
Zions.6 
Because the second prong of section 318(3) applies as a 
matter of law to cases involving the full payment of an 
obligation, the only remaining issue in this case is the factual 
question of whether First Security ever received notice that it 
was to pay Zions. This factual issue has been conclusively 
decided by both this Court and the district court. This Court 
stated in its prior opinion: 
The parties also debate the question of whether First 
Security ever received, beyond mere notice of the 
assignment, notice to make payment directly to Zions as 
contemplated in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1990). It 
clearly did not, and we decline to address the issue 
further. 
889 P.2d 467, 470 n.5 (emphasis added). Because the dual notice 
required by the Utah Code was "clearly11 not provided, the 
district court erred in not granting judgment in favor of First 
Security. 
6The district court was bound to follow the law as announced 
by the Utah Supreme Court in America First. In Petty v. Clark, 
192 P.2d 589 (Utah 1948), the Utah Supreme Court held that where 
an intermediate appellate court announces a rule and remands a 
case, but in the meantime the highest appellate court has reached 
a contrary conclusion, the lower court "is bound by the decision 
of the highest court of appeals." Id. at 594. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FIRST SECURITY AND 
CAPITOL WERE NOT ENTITLED TO MODIFY THEIR CONTRACT PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 70A-3-318(2) NOTWITHSTANDING NOTICE OF THE 
ASSIGNMENT. 
As a matter of law, First Security and Capitol were free to 
modify or substitute the terms of their original contract. Utah 
law provides in section 70A-9-318(2): 
(2) So far as the right to payment or a part thereof 
under an assigned contract has not been fully earned by 
performance, and notwithstanding notification of the 
assignment, any modification of or substitution for the 
contract made in good faith and in accordance with 
reasonable commercial standards is effective against an 
assignee unless the account debtor has otherwise agreed 
but the assignee acquires corresponding rights under 
the modified or substituted contract. The assignment 
may provide that such modification or substitution is a 
breach by the assignor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(2) (1990) (emphasis added). 
This section makes clear that if a contract is executory7, 
the original parties to the contract may modify or substitute the 
contract in good faith and in accordance with reasonable 
commercial standards. Such modification is effective against an 
assignee "notwithstanding notification of the assignment." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
The official comment to subsection 9-318(2) states: 
7A contract that is executory is one in which something 
remains to be done by one or more of the parties. Martin v. John 
Clay & Co., 167 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943) (quoted by 
Levitz v. Warrington, 877 P.2d 1245 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(Dissent)). The Asset Purchase Agreement in this case was 
executory because the value of the assets and the price had not 
yet been determined as outlined in the contract. 
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Prior law was in confusion as to whether modification 
of an executory contract by account debtor and assignor 
without the assignee's consent was possible after 
notification of an assignment. Subsection (2) makes 
good faith modifications by assignor and account debtor 
without the assignee's consent effective against the 
assignee even after notification. This rule may do 
some violence to accepted doctrines of contract law. 
Nevertheless it is a sound and indeed a necessary rule 
in view of the realities of large scale procurement. 
As made clear by this comment, First Security and Capitol 
were free to modify or substitute their contract, and any 
assignee, such as Zions or 4447 Associates, is bound by those 
modifications or substitutions. In the case of Bank One, Texas 
v. Communication Specialists, 813 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1991), a dispute apparently arose between the original parties to 
a contract. An amount of $47,780 was originally due on the 
contract, and the contract was assigned to a third party. The 
parties to the contract thereafter modified their agreement and 
reduced the account receivable to $24,206.61. Id. at 758. The 
court held that, notwithstanding notification, the adjustment was 
binding on the assignee. The court held that an assignee was 
entitled only to the rights that the assignor "possessed after 
modification." Id. 
In this case, as in Bank One, Capitol and First Security 
had a dispute about how much, if anything, was owed on the Asset 
Purchase Agreement. The original parties modified their original 
agreement through the means of a Settlement Agreement. 
Notwithstanding the prior assignment of the Asset Purchase 
17 
Agreement to Zions, and subsequent reassignment to 4447 
Associates, the modification of the original agreement was 
binding on both assignees. 4447 Associates possessed only the 
rights that Capitol possessed after modification.8 
Because section 9-318(2) allows the original parties to the 
contract to modify the contract, the parties can clearly enter 
into a settlement agreement concerning the contract. One 
commentator writes: 
Does the right to modify the assigned contract include 
the right to terminate it altogether? If both Seller 
and Buyer agree that the widget supply contract should 
end prematurely, this can happen without the consent of 
Bank, although such termination might constitute 
default under the assignment. Official Comment 2 to 
UCC § 9-318 certainly suggests that modification 
includes termination. Article 9 itself draws no 
distinction between a reduction in supply of widgets by 
20 percent and total abandonment of the supply 
contract; in both cases, the key is honesty and 
commercial reasonableness. 
B. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, § 11.04[2] (1993). There was no evidence at 
trial that the Settlement Agreement was not entered into in good 
faith or was not commercially reasonable. Accordingly, the 
contract was properly modified and, notwithstanding the fact that 
this Court held that notice had been received, the district court 
erred in entering judgment against First Security. 
8Under section 318(2), 4447 Associates may still have a 
cause of action against Capitol for modifying the Asset Purchase 
Agreement. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 4447 
ASSOCIATES. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "the award of attorney 
fees is allowed only in accordance with the terms of the 
contract." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 
1988) . The only contract in this case is the Asset Purchase 
Agreement between First Security and Capitol.9 That contract 
states: 
In the event of a dispute among the parties arising 
under this Agreement, the party or parties prevailing 
in such dispute shall be entitled to collect their 
costs from the other parties, including without 
limitation court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The dispute between First Security and 4447 Associates did 
not "arise under" the Asset Purchase Agreement but revolved 
around whether First Security had received notice of a subsequent 
assignment of the Asset Purchase Agreement. First Security was 
not a party to this subsequent assignment. Nor was the 
assignment contemplated in the Asset Purchase Agreement. 
If there had been a dispute between First Security and 4447 
Associates regarding the proper interpretation of some provision 
of the Asset Purchase Agreement, then 4447 Associates, as the 
assignee of Capitol's assignee, would have been entitled to 
recover any attorney's fees that Capitol would have been entitled 
9There is no contract between First Security and 4447 
Associates. 
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to receive. However, the dispute between 4447 Associates and 
First Security for which the trial court awarded attorney's fees 
did not relate to the Asset Purchase Agreement but to a 
subsequent agreement between Capitol and Zions and a' later 
subsequent agreement between Zions and 4447 Associates. The 
question before the trial court related solely to whether notice 
of the assignment was given. That dispute did not "arise under" 
the Asset Purchase Agreement. Thus, the district court erred in 
awarding attorney's fees to 4447 Associates. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the 
judgment entered in favor of 4447 Associates and remand the case 
for judgment in favor of First Security. 
DATED this £> day of June, 1998. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
/ 
Scott H. Clar) 
James S. Jardine 
Brent D. Wride 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 4447 A: 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ) 
a National Banking Association ) 
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah ) 
general partnership, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, ] 
a National corporation ] 
Defendant. 
ORDER CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S 
I DEFENSES TO JUDGMENT 
v Case No. 870901578CN 
) Judge Frank G. Noel 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions ot Law 
Concerning Defendant's Defenses to Judgment, the Court's previous 
orders and the entire record in this action, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendant's defenses relating to Section 70A-9-318 are 
hereby DENIED. 
2. Defendant's defenses which allegedly accrued prior to 
receipt of the notice of assignment are DENIED. 
3. Defendant's motion for entry of judgment in favor of 
defendant is DENIED. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
BYDI 
ssociates 
 EPUTY CLERK 
JUL 1 1997 
^JShUL. 
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4. All other defenses to judgment in favor of plaintiff 
which are raised or asserted by defendant, are hereby DENIED. 
5. Pursuant to the Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion 
for Stayf the Court again DENIES defendant's request that this 
Court refrain from entering judgment. 
6. Defendant's defenses relating to the award o£ attorney 
fees and costs in favor of plaintiff are DENIED. 
7. Pursuant to the Court's February 29, 1996 Order on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for 
Stay, judgment should enter in favor of Plaintiff 4447 Associates 
against Defendant First Security Financial in the amount of 
$282f741.52 as of March 27, 1997. From and after March 27, 1997, 
interest shall accrue thereon at the per diem rate of $33.51 in 
favor of Plaintiff 4447 Associates and against Defendant First 
Security. 
8. Judgment should enter in favor of plaintiff 4447 
Associates against defendant First Security Financial in the amount 
of $82,240.12 for attorney fees and costs incurred as of March 17, 
1997. From and after the date of entry of judgment, interest shall 
accrue at the per diem rate of $22.53 in favor of Plaintiff 4447 
Associates and against Defendant First. Security. 





APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
James S. Jardine 
Scott H. Clark 
Brent D. Wride 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
(m»km 
affrey M. Jones 
Jy Mark Gibb 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be hand-delivered this AN day of Ap^ rtTf 1997, to 
the following: 
James S. Jardine 
Brent D. Wride 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
jmg/44471 order! 
JTUL^L 
7 3 ^ 
Exhibit B 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. (1741) 
J. Mark Gibb, Esq. (5702) 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 850 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 4447 Associates 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ] 
a National Banking Association ] 




FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a National corporation 
Defendant. ] 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
1 OF LAW CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S | DEFENSES TO JUDGMENT 
l Case No. 870901578CN 
( Judge Frank G. Noel 
This matter is before the Court on First Security Financial's 
claims of defenses to entry of judgment argued by defendant after 
remand to this Court. Pursuant to the Court's Order on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Stay, the 
parties filed extensive memoranda and presented argument on October 
3, 1996 and March 20, 1997 (the "Hearings") regarding all remaining 
issues. Plaintiff 4447 Associates was represented by Jeffrey M. 
Jones and J. Mark Gibb of Durham, Evans, Jones & Pinegar; Defendant 
First Security Financial was represented by James S. Jardine and 
Brent D. Wride of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker. Pursuant to Rule 52, 
JUL 1 1997 
SALT LAKE dk/WTY.^ 
:PUTY CLERK * <*£V <yXhi4^ BY DEPUTY CLERK 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and based upon a review of the 
evidence presented at trial in this matter and reargued upon 
remand, the memoranda filed by both parties, the stipulations of 
counsel regarding the reasonableness of each party's respective 
attorney fees and costs and the arguments of counsel at the 
Hearings, the Court is now fully informed and enters the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. There is insufficient evidence in the record to support 
defendant's defenses to entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
The inferences which defendant requests the Court to draw from the 
ambiguous evidence admitted at trial and now argued by defendant 
are insufficient to establish defendant's defenses. Specifically: 
a. Defendant's defenses regarding its breach of 
warranty defenses and claims against Capitol Thrift and Richard 
Christenson are not supported by the evidence in the record. 
b. Defendant's defenses pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 70A-9-318, are not supported by the decision of the Court 
of Appeals and are not supported by the evidence in the record. 
c. Defendant's remaining defenses whereby it alleges 
that it is not obligated to pay plaintiff the payments owea under 
the Asset Purchase Agreement are likewise not supported by the 
evidence in the record. 
2. Prior to hearing argument on attorney fees and costs, the 
parties stipulated that plaintiff incurred reasonable attorney fees 
and costs through February 28, 1997 in its prosecution of this 
2 
ni&', 
action in the amount of $103,358.40 and that defendant incurred 
reasonable attorney fees and costs in defense of this action in the 
amount of $107,824.60. The parties further stipulated that if 
plaintiff were entitled to attorney fees and costs the amount of 
attorney fees and costs awarded to plaintiff should be reduced in 
an amount equal to 10% of the total fees and costs of plaintiff for 
fees and costs incurred regarding defendant's motion for partial 
summary judgment and in an amount equal to 10% of the total 
attorney fees and costs of defendant for fees incurred ih bringing 
the motion for partial summary judgment. The parties agreed not to 
challenge their respective attorney fees and costs except as to 
entitlement under the Asset Purchase Agreement. 
3. The Court finds the parties' stipulation regarding 
attorney fees and costs to be reasonable under applicable Utah law. 
Specifically, plaintiff incurred reasonable attorney fees and costs 
through February 28, 1997 in its prosecution of this action in the 
amount of $103,358.40 and that defendant incurred reasonable 
attorney fees and costs in defense of this action in the amount of 
$107,824.60. Further, it is reasonable that attorney fees and 
costs the amount of attorney fees and costs awarded to plaintiff 
should be reduced in an amount equal to 10% of the total fees and 
costs of plaintiff for fees and costs incurred regarding 
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and in an amount 
equal to 10% of the total attorney fees and costs of defendant for 
fees and costs incurred in bringing the motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
o 
4. The Court further finds pursuant to the stipulation of 
the parties that the work described in the affidavits of counsel 
for plaintiff were actually performed, that the work performed was 
reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter, and that 
the attorneys' and other paralegal's billing rates were consistent 
with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services. The Court has further considered all other circumstances 
which require consideration of additional factors pursuant to Utah 
law, including those listed in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, and finds that fees and costs of $82,240.12 were 
reasonably and necessarily incurred by plaintiff in enforcing the 
terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement. These fees and costs 
incurred are awardable as they were incurred and arose under 
paragraph 22 of the Asset Purchase Agreement. 
5. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff is entitled 
to an award of fees and costs of $82,240.12. 
6. Each finding of fact which may be construed to be a 
conclusion of law shall be so construed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 70A~9-318(3) does not apply 
to this action pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
2. Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9-318(l) does apply to 
this action pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
3. Pursuant to the Court's Order on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Stay, the terms of the 
4 
Asset Purchase Agreement and applicable Utah law including Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), plaintiff is 
entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred. 
4. The Court has the authority to consider and apply the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in America First Credit Union v. 
First Security Bank of Utah, No. 950274 (Utah January 21, 1997); 
however, the America First decision is not applicable to this 
action as the Court's decision interprets Utah Code Annotated 
Section 70A-9-318(3), not Section 70A-9-318(1). 
5. Each conclusion of law which may be construed to be a 
finding of fact shall be so construed. 
DATED this / day of^Apr±l)v 199' 
BY THE Ci 
FRANK G 
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ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT i s made and e n t e r e d i n t o t h i s Jj^ day 
of \~1~^-<J -\^-~^<*\ , 1982/ by and between First Security 
Financial, a Utan corporation (*?S Financial"); Capitol Thrift and 
Loan Company, a Utah corporation ("Capitol") ; Richard A. 
Christenson, an individual ("Christenson") ; and Bruce L. Moesser, 
an individual ("Moesser")• 
R E C I T A L S : 
A. Capitol is an operating industrial loan corporation 
under the laws of the State of Utah. 
B. Christenson is the majority stockholder of Capitol. 
C. Christenson and Moesser are the president and 
executive vice president of Capitol, respectively. 
D. FS Financial' is a newly organized industrial loan 
corporation under 'the laws -of the State of Utah. 
E. Upon consummation of the transactions contemplated 
herein; FS Financial will be a wholly owned subsidiary off First 
Security Corporation ("FS Corp."). 
F. FS Financial is in the process of acquiring the 
assets and liabilities of Murray First Thrift & Loan Company 
("MPT"} pursuant to that certain Purchase and Assumotion Agreement 
between FS Financial, FS Corp., MFT, et al.f dated ^ycJ^^r /3 , 
1982 (the "MFT Agreement"). 
G. In connection with and contingent upon its 
acquisition of MFT, FS Financial desires also to acquire the 
assets of Capitol, and Capitol is willing to sell its assets to 
FS Financial, on the terms and conditions set forth below. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Purchase of Assets. Capitol hereby agrees to sell 
to FS Financial, and FS Financial hereby agrees to purchase from 
Capitol, all of the assets of Capitol as shown on the audited 
balance sheet of Capitol dated June 30, 1982, attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof by this reference, subject to 
adjustment-,^ provided in Paragraph 3 below. Included among the 
assets sold* shall be all'leases, insurance policies and other 
contract rights, and all books of account, customer records and 
documents of every nature relating to the business of Capitol 
being acquired Jby FS .Financial. Not included among the assets 
sold shall be the corporate documents, books and records which 
relate to the overall organization and- continuing financial 
affairs of Capitol and only those additional specific items of 
tangible and intangible personal property identified on Exhibit 
mBn, attached hereto and made a part hereof -by this reference, and 
Capitolfs leasehold interest in the premises currently occupied by 
it in the Continental Bank Building in Salt Lake City, Utah* 
2. Consideration, As consideration for the purchase 
of the assets of Capitol, except as limited in the following 
sentence, FS Financial agrees to assume all of the liabilities of 
Capitol set forth on the balance sheet attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A," as adjusted pursuant to Paragraph 3 below, and also all 
liabilities of Capitol which may be asserted after the Closing 
Date which relate 'to the collection of any of the receivables of 
Capitol acquired by FS Financial and which were incurred in the 
normal course of business prior to the Closing Date, and to 
indemnify and hold Capitol harmless therefrom. Not included among 
the liabilities assumed shall be any liabilities of Capitol not 
eapressly disclosed on .said balance .sheet .(other _than those 
incurred in the normal course of business prior to Closing which 
relate to the collection of receivables) ,'any liabilities arising 
out of or in connection with Capitol's leasehold interest in its 
premises in the Continental Bank Building, and any accrued but 
unpaid wages, employment taxes, employee benefit plan liabilities, 
net income, franchise, sales, use, property and any other state or 
Federal tax liabilities, including any tax liabilities arising as 
a result of* this transaction, and Capitol agrees to indemnify and 
hold FS Financial harmless therefrom. 
As further consideration, subject to adjustment as 
provided in Paragraph 3 below, FS Financial agrees to pay Capitol 
the sum of One Million Three Hundred Seventy-Nine Thousand Nine 
Hundred Eleven and 78/100 Dollars ($1,379,911.78) cash, payable as 
follows: 
(a) Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) at 
the Closing (hereinafter defined); 
N^ .fi / c77 7 77. Vy 
(b) The balance of One Million One Hundred 
Seventy-Nfne-Thousand-Nirne^HundreQ'^Bleven and ~787100 
Dol-lar-s—(^-trl^STSirnS)-sTfall be paid in a lump sum on 
the third anniversary of the Closing Date; 
(c) The principal amount of the deferred portion of 
the purchase price shall earn interest at the rate of ten 
percent (10.0%) per annum and accrued interest shall be 
-2-
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paid irv-twelve (12) quarterly installments beginning 
three (3) months after the Closing Date. 
For purposes of arriving at the above purchase price, the assets 
of Capitol were valued at 'their book value and the cash portion 
of the purchase price was determined to be equal to the book net 
worth of CaDitol as shown on the balance sheet attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A". 
and At the end of the three (3) year period of deferral 
prior to the payment of the principal amount of the deferred 
portion of the purchase price, the xjeaj^  estate and receivables 
(of Capitol acquired by FS Financial shall be valued in the manner 
[set foYtirnbeiow^ In the event that (i) the aggregate value ot~"the 
Lj^ eal estate iT'les's^Fhan Its POO* value as or tne~"Closinq Date 
;and/or (ii) the actual and anticipated losses orT the"tol2Fction of 
t^rTF"^ LmQunt of the receivables as of the Closing Date exceecTythe 
preserve for losses as"~or tfte Closing Date, the principal amount 
*ot tne ceierreti portion of the purchase price shall De~~acTjIisted 
taownwa^LJLn an equivalent amount. Further, the principal amount 
of the deferred portion of the purchase price shall also be 
adjusted downward in the amount of any-liabilities of Capitol 
•relating to the collection of receivables which were incurred 
in the normal course of business prior to Closing but were' not 
disclosed on Capitol's balance sheet at Closing and which were 
i^ssumed by FS Financial hereunder, yhp aggregate of_such downward 
adjustments of the principal amount of the deferred por 
«the purchase price shall in no event exceed une Million Vu±± 
($lr Q00 f 0 0 0'. OOJ^ NoTwitnstanding any such downward adjustments 
"ot tne principal amount of the deferred portion- of the purchase 
price, there shall be no adjustment of the amount of interest paid 
by FS Financial under Paragraph 2(c) hereof during the three (3) 
year period. 
f Actual ana, anticipated losses on receivables shall 
'include losses on those receivables already written off by FS 
Financial in accordance with standard financial practice and FS 
Financial's actual experience and also one hundred percent 
(100.0%) of .those receivables classified either as a "loss" or 
as "doubtful" by the Department of Financial Institutions in its 
ost recent examination of FS Financial, provided one has been 
onducted within three 1(3) months prior to the end of the three 
^3) year period; provided, further, if no such examination has 
£een conducted within £he final three (3) months, the parties 
shall callMfor one. Out-of-pocket costs of collection incurred 
liy FS Financial with respect to any such receivables (other than 
\iith respect to any liabilities relating to the collection of 




including withoujt-limitation reasonable attorney's fees, shall be 
added to the principal amount of such receivables in determining 
K the amount of loss suffered thereon. Any such receivables which 
are written off by FS Financial or which are classified AS a 
•loss" or as •doubtful" for purposes of this paragraph shall be 
reassigned to Capitol by FS Financial at the end of the three (3) 
year period. 
Any remaining unsold real estate at the end of the three 
(3) year period shall be valued by M.A.I, appraisal as of that • 
time. To the extent any real estate has been sold during the 
three. (3) year period, it shall be valued at its contract sales 
price. In both cases, the value of the .real estate shall be 
reduced by the costs of sale and preparation for sale, such as 
necessary fix-up expenses, if any, incurred by FS Financial. 
In order to facilitate the above valuations, FS Financial 
shall keep its books in such a way that the receivables and real 
estate acquired from Capitol can be separately identified at all 
/ times during the three (3) year period. 
~"3."-Thanees prj>Qr to Closingr.rTo ^ thejextent. there are 
chances in the assets, liabilities and net worth of Capitol 
between June 30, 1982, and the Closing Date, which changes are a 
result of transactions entered into in the ordinary course of 
business, it is understood and agreed by the parties that those 
assets being sold by Capitol to FS Financial shall be the assets 
of Capitol, as defined herein, as of the Closing Date, and that 
those liabilities being assumed by FS Financial shall be the 
liabilities of Capitol, as defined herein, as of the Closing 
Date, Further, the principal amount of the deferred portion of 
the purchase price shall be adjusted up or down, as the case may 
be, in an amount equal to the change'in the book net worth of 
Capitol between June 30, 1982, and the Closing Date. For this 
purpose, Capitol shall prepare a balance sheet of those of its 
assets and liabilities as of the Closing Date which are included 
in the sale, complete with detailed schedules identifying 
individual assets and liabilities and also any off-balance sheet 
items included in the sale. At the Closing, the parties shall 
execute an appropriate amendment to this Agreement specifying the 
principal amount of the deferred portion of the purchase price as 
adjusted in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. 
Capitol hereby represents and warrants that the balance 
i h ! ^ * M » ? r h ^ h P r M r ^ ^ F Y h i h i l * »ft* 1 * t.r.no^,c.ojnpjUB±e^aildL'^s ^ 
^accujiai;?! in every m a t e r i a l r e s p e c t as of June 30, 1982, and t h a t 
^during the p e r i o d beg inn ing June 3D, 1982, and ending on the da te 
of t h i s Agreement t h e r e have been no m a t e r i a l changes in the 
assets and liabilities of Capitol other than as a result of 
transactions entered into in the ordinary course of business, 
Capitol hereby covenants and agrees that during the period 
beginning with the date of this Agreement and ending on the 
Closing Date, it shall not enter into any transactions other than 
in the regular.course of business. .Capitol further represents and 
warrants that the balance sheet to be prepared by it as of the 
Closing Date will be true, complete and accurate in every material 
respect as of the Closing.Date. 
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, it shall 
be a condition precedent to the obligation of FS Financial to " 
jrlose tnis transaction that there have been nffTirarterial changes in 
The assets or liabilities of Capitol between June 3U, iy82, and 
the Closing Date, and that the representations, warranties and 
covenants of Capitol contained in this Paragraph shall not have 
been breached in any material respect. 
4. Payment of Indemnity. The amount of any payment made 
by FS Financial or Capitol to a third party for which FS Financial 
or Capitol is entitled to indemnification hereunder shall accrue 
ihterest'"atr::the~rate of ten "percent"(10.0%). per~annum from the 
date of payment by FS Financial or Capitol to said third party 
through the date of reimbursement by the indemnifying party. If 
FS Financial is the party entitled to indemnification, it may 
require payment immediately or, at its option, it may set ofr the 
principal and interest portions of the amount of such indemnity 
against the payments otherwise due Capitol under Subparagraphs 
2"(b) and 2 (c) ,~ respectively, as adjusted pursuant to Paragraph 3, 
above. If Capitol is the party entitled to indemnification, it 
may require payment immediately or, at its option,' it may add the 
principal and interest portions of the amount of such indemnity to 
the payments otherwise due it under Subparagraphs 2(b) and 2(c), 
respectively, as adjusted pursuant to Paragraph 3, above. 
5. Personnel. It is contemplated that FS Financial will 
employ all of the current personnel of Capitol in FS Financial's 
operation. In particular, it is of the essence to. this 
transaction that Capitol's president and executive vice president, 
Richard A. Christenson and Bruce L. Hoesser, respectively, become 
officers in FS Financial. However, the terms of any such 
employment arrangement shall be subject to good faith negotiations 
between the parties and no assurances are given in this Agreement 
as to what the particulars of such employment arrangements can or 
will be. It is understood, however, that all employee benefits or 
claims, whether of a pension, health or other nature, which have 
accrued or which arise out of events prior to the Closing Date, 
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shall be and remain the sole liability of Capitol, and Capitol 
agrees to indemnify and hold FS Financial harmless therefrom. 
6. Noncompetition. During such time as Christenson and 
Hoesser are employed by FS Financial, Christenson and Moesser 
covenant and agree, each for himself, that he will not engage, 
directly or Indirectly, whether as sole proprietor, pitrTrrer, 
shareholder, ofiicer, director, employee or consultant, in any 
V^ I ^ c t^ v i ty *n t ^ indTTs~trial loan, thrTft and loan or banking 
industry in theHState oiLUtah except as an omcer ana employee of 
FS Financial. It is understood that Christenson, Hoesser, Sally 
Taylor, and Meriyn Hanks are officers and/or trustees of and will 
continue to have an ownership and participation in Franklin 
Financial, Cape Trust, the corporate entity surviving Capitol 
Thrift and Loan (which is contemplated to be named "The Capitol 
Company*1), Capitol Leasing, Seahurst, and affiliated companies, 
and that they will be allowed to wind down and preserve the value 
of these assets without being in violation of the terms of this 
Agreement, 
If at any time Christenson or Hoesser leave the employ of 
FS-Financial,: for • any reason, _Christensqn_and_Hoesser covenant and 
agree, each for himself,"that he "will not dfvuige or make use of 
any trade secrets, customer information or other confidential 
knowhow or information gained by him as a result of his employment 
by FS Financial nor will he solicit other persons to leave their 
employ with FS Financial, other than Christenson's personal 
secretary, Sally Taylor. _ Also, for—one ID—y.e_ar after leaving the 
emolov of_FS Financial, Christenson agrees not to engage in any 
^activity in direct competition with F"§ financial in gKJ^ frrirf-t and 
J\ loan industry. " " """" 
vv 
'L 
Fur ther , Capi to l agrees to change i t s name as of the 
Closing Date and to t r an s f e r to FS Financial at the Closing a l l 
r igh t s to the use of i t s name, but reserving tq^-ttse-Lf^the r ight 
to use any other name which includes the name ^api tc^ l^but not 
the words "Thrif t and Loan" or any combination th-ereodS^^^- &C 
7. Government Approvals. I t sha l l be a condition 
precedent to the ob l i ga t i on of FS Financial to close this 
t ransact ion t ha t FS Corp s h a l l have received the prior approval 
of the Federal Reserve Board to acquire the shares of tS Financial 
in connection with FS F i n a n c i a l ' s acquis i t ion of the assets and 
l i a b i l i t i e s of Capi to l and HFT as se t forth herein and in the HFT 
Agreement.., I t s h a l l be a further condition precedent hereto that 
the Utah Department of F inancia l I n s t i t u t i o n s shal l have given i t s 





regulatory approval or consent which has not been obtained, 
shall be a further condition precedent hereto tihat the MPT 
Agreement be consummated in accordance with its Serins. 
8. Closing. The closing of this transaction (the 
"Closing- or "Closing Date") shall take place at t W same time and 
place and simultaneously with the closing of the HFT Agreement, 
but in no event later than six (6) months after the\date of this 
Agreement. _At the Closing
 f Capitol shall transfer ;title to those 
Of. its assets being SQIQ to JbS^TtnSn^lal by"cMt claim oeedT^bill 
ojTjsale, or otner appropriate instrument of transfer, ana 
Financial snail assumg_aJJ. of the liabilities ot Capitol \ 
>as agreed to assume hereunder by an appropriate assumption ~~ 
ag££^m¥i^ At the Closing, FS FinanciaiTTfiaTIX^STsonpay^to Capitol 
"the pcrtXon of the purchase price payable under Paragraph 2(a) 
hereof, and the parties shall execute an appropriate amendment to 
this Agreement to specify the exact Closing Date and the principal 
amount of the deferred portion of the purchase price payable under 
Paragraph 2(b) hereof, as adjusted at the Closing pursuant to 
Paragraph 3 hereof. 
9. , Guaranty. Christenson hereby" ouarantP«g fha* *h* 
representations and warranties made by Capitol herein are true, 
complete^and ^rrurxtf* m pvery material respect as of tfif ^ ^ -
l 
for whj^ ch jthev are made
 r and hereby guarantees the performance by 
Capitol^of i t s ob l iga t ion of indemnity with resppr^ *-n iJL^w^^^t-?r^ 
and obl igat ions of Capi to l not assumed by FS Financial hprpunnpr^ 
u'ch Guaranties to De cont inuing , absolute, unconditional and 
/primary. ~ " ~ 
10. Press Releases . All pa r t i e s agree that no press 
re lease or other s ta tement , whether writ ten or verbal, shal l be 
made or given to any rep resen ta t ive of the news media with respect 
to th i s t ransac t ion without the express prior approval of a l l 
other p a r t i e s . 
11 . Corporate Author i ty . Capitol represents and 
warrants t h a t i t i s a duly organized, validly existing corporation 
in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah; that i t is 
in fu l l compliance with a l l laws, regulat ions, orders and other 
governmental ru l ings which regula te or purport to regulate 
Cap i to l ' s operat ion as an i n d u s t r i a l loan corporation in the State 
of Utah; tha t i t has f u l l corporate power and authority to 
execute, del iver and ca r ry out the provisions of th is Agreement, 
including .the necessary consent of i t s shareholders; and that when 
so execute'3 and de l ivered t h i s Agreement shal l consti tute a legal , 
val id and binding o b l i g a t i o n of Capi tol , enforceable against i t in 




accordance with its terms. The representations and warranties 
mace in this paragraph shall be deemed made as of the date hereof 
and again at the Closing." Capitol and FS Financial agree to 
provide each other at the Closing with certified copies of Board 
of Directors and shareholder resolutions authorizing this 
transaction. 
1 12. Survival. The parties understand and agree that all 
representations and warranties made herein are true and effective 
l/j both when made and as of the Closing, and that all such 
representations and warranties shall survive the Closing. 
13. Notice. Any notice or other communication to any 
party under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed 
,,to have been given on the dateon which such notice is either hand 
delivered to the party • to -whom such-notice is directed or is* 
tA deposited in the United States mail as a certified or registered 
' letter, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, properly 
addressed to such party at the address specified below: 
If to FS Financial, at: 
First Security Financial 
P. 0. Box 30006 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
Attn: Treasurer 
If to Capitol, at: 
c/o Richard A. Christenson 
2356 Dailin Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
If to Christenson, at: 
c/o First Security Financial 
135 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
With a copy to: 
Richard A. Christenson 
2356 Dallin Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
If to Moesser, at: 
c/o First'Security Financial 
135 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
With a copy to: 
Bruce L. Moesser 
2467 East 3750 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Any such .address may be changed by giving notice thereof to the 
other parties in accordance vith the above urocedure. 
14. Binding Effect. This Agreement snail inure to the 
benefit of and be binding upon the parties a>nd their respective, 
legal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns. 
V^ 15. Counterpart Originals. For the convenience of the 
partiesf this Agreement shall be executed in four (4) counterpart 
originals, which taken together<shall constitute a single agreement. 
\S 16- Headings. The headings of the Paragraphs herein have 
been inserted for ease of reference only and shall not control or 
affect the meaning or interpretation of any of the terms and 
provisions hereof. 
%/ 17. Governing Lav. . This Agreement is entered into under 
and shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. 
18. Further Action. The parties hereby agree to execute 
] / and deliver such additional documents and to take such further 
action as may become necessary or desirable to fully carry out the 
provisions and intent of this Agreement. 
/ 19. Severability. In the event one or more of the 
Wprovisions contained in this Agreement shall for any reason be held 
invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, 
illegality'or unenforceability shall not affect the validity, 
legality and enforceability of any other provision hereof, and this 
Agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal or 
-9-
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unenforceable provision had never been contained herein, provided 
that the Agreement as so modified preserves the basic intent of the 
parties. 
Construction, As used herein, 
21. Prior Agreements Superseded, This Agreement supersedes 
any prior understandings or agreements among the parties, whether 
written or verbal, respecting the within subject matter, and contains 
the entire understanding of the parties with respect thereto. 
22. Enforcement. In the event of a dispute among the 
parties arising under this Agreement, the party or parties prevail-
ing in such dispute shall be entitled to collect their costs from 
the other parties, including without limitation court costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this 
Agreement on the date hereinabove first written. 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL 
By •^<2^d. 
Elmer D. Tucker 
Vice President 
CAPITOL THRIFT AND LOAN COMPANY 
BY L/^-<-
Richard A. Christenson, 
President 
^f^'-r/ti 
Richard .A. Christenson, 
Individually 
Bruce L. Moesser, 
Individually 
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